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Banking and Exchange Rate Relations 
between Hong Kong and Mainland 
China in Historical Perspective: 
1965–751 
Catherine R. Schenk 
Introduction 
The ‘one country, two systems’ structure established to govern the rela-
tionship between Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China was an innova-
tive and comprehensive solution to particular economic and political 
challenges posed by the return of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997. At the 
time of the drafting of the Basic Law, the integration of the colony into 
the regional economy of Southeast China through outward FDI had 
already begun, and from the mid-1980s this process facilitated the trans-
formation of the Hong Kong economy from a manufacturing base to one 
dominated by financial and commercial services. It was recognized on 
both sides of the negotiations that the territory’s viability and future pros-
perity relied on retaining independence over a range of key fundamen-
tals, including a separate and independent currency and monetary system 
that was at the foundation of Hong Kong’s attraction as an international 
financial centre for the PRC and also for the rest of the Asian region. An 
important credibility mechanism for the HK$ (as for the inconvertible 
RMB at this time) was the exchange rate link to the US$. Since this was 
also the anchor for the RMB after 1997, the linked rate system kept the 
relationship between the RMB and the HK$ stable. 
While the rapid growth and development of the Mainland economy 
after 1999 outstripped many predictions, the relatively poor performance 
of Hong Kong from 1997 until 2003 has changed the context in which 
the one country two currencies system operates. The de-linking of the 
RMB from the US$ and subsequent appreciation from July 2005 has 
further complicated the monetary relations between Hong Kong SAR and 
the rest of China. Hong Kong’s interest rates and monetary policy are 
now arguably more closely aligned with those of the USA than those of 
45 
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its main trade partner. The increased use of RMB in banking and other 
transactions in Hong Kong SAR is further evidence of the erosion of the 
barriers between the two currencies. In February 2008, RMB deposits in 
Hong Kong had reached RMB47.8 billion, an increase of 92% over a year, 
although this still represented only 0.8% of total deposits in Hong Kong. 
Cross-border financial flows within the banking system have also acceler-
ated with the accumulation of net liabilities in Hong Kong to banks on the 
Mainland since 1999.2 Once the RMB and the HK$ reached parity against 
the US$ in January 2007 there was a psychological shift in attitudes about 
the relative merits of each currency as well real concerns over the potential 
impact of the appreciation of the RMB on the cost of imports into Hong 
Kong from the Mainland.3 The potential for further appreciation of the 
RMB against the HK$ poses challenges as well as opportunities for Hong 
Kong consumers and producers and heightens public attention on the 
implications of separate currencies within a single country. 
The financial, monetary and banking relations between Hong Kong and 
Mainland China have a long and intimate history that should be borne in 
mind when assessing the challenges faced by the separate monetary 
systems operating today. As Chan’s chapter in this volume shows, due to 
the commercial integration of the region, the HK$ circulated widely in 
Southeast China both as a store of value and as a medium of exchange. 
This monetary integration increased during the collapse of China’s mone-
tary system in the late 1940s.4 With the establishment of the PRC, HK$ 
were collected by the new government of China and their use in private 
transactions was prohibited in order to promote the new national Chinese 
currency. Banking relations between the two territories were never severed 
but they were put under severe strain by the nationalisation of banking 
and commerce in the early 1950s. Nevertheless, this article will emphasize 
that there was considerable continuity in the banking relations between 
Hong Kong and Mainland China and will explore the operations and 
implications of exchange rate dynamics in the 1960s and 1970s when the 
global fixed exchange rate system collapsed, destabilising the exchange 
rate between the HK$ and RMB. An important contribution is to present 
new data on the activities of Mainland Chinese banks operating in Hong 
Kong during this period, collected from official archives. This data confirm 
the extent of cross-border activities throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. 
International banking 
Hong Kong has traditionally been an important international financial 
centre for the Mainland, surpassing Shanghai from the mid-1930s as 
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military and political disturbances interrupted activity there. The mon-
etary chaos of the 1930s also drew foreign banks into operating the 
exchange rate system. King recounts how during the crisis caused by 
the rise in the silver price in 1933–34 H.H. Kung and T.V. Soong of the 
Bank of China drew Henchman of the Hongkong Bank into a secret 
partnership to support the exchange rate of the Chinese dollar. His 
success earned him a gold wristwatch and the confidence of Soong and 
Kung that put the Hongkong Bank at the forefront of support schemes 
over the next few years.5 Although the new Communist regime after 
1949 severely restricted the activities of foreign banks and most extracted 
themselves from China during the early 1950s, the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank (HSBC) maintained its presence through these difficult 
years and was able to restore some of its business from the mid-1950s. 
Relations between the Bank of China, the HSBC and the Hong Kong 
government were cordial and generally functioned well.6 However, 
there were delicate political aspects of the Bank of China’s role in Hong 
Kong. In 1961, the Bank of China requested subsidised land to build 
workers’ accommodation but the project was delayed because the land 
needed to be cleared of 1500 squatters. The Political Advisor recom-
mended to the Colonial Secretary that 
‘I feel that we should be no more or less helpful to the BoC than we 
would be to any other employer wishing to take similar action. 
What we want to avoid doing is creating the impression that for 
political reasons we are putting obstacles in the BoCs way.’7 
Ten years later, however, when the question of land for workers’ 
housing arose again, the Director of Special Branch advised that 
from an internal security viewpoint it is undesirable to allow the 
BoC or any other CPG [PRC] organization to build further large 
fortress-type buildings, especially on road junctions or other strate-
gic locations. Hence Special Branch would wish to be consulted on 
any sites which may be offered to the bank.8 
While the Bank of China was the most prominent Mainland-
controlled bank in Hong Kong it was not the largest. Table 3.1 shows 
that by 1970 there were 13 PRC-controlled banks in Hong Kong with a 
total of 55 branches.9 They included the Bank of China, other banks 
registered on the Mainland, and banks registered in Hong Kong but 
controlled by the PRC. 
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Table 3.1 Mainland Chinese Controlled Banks in Hong Kong 1970 
Number of Offices 
Jan 1970 
Bank of China 2 
Bank of Communications 6 
China and South Sea Bank 5 
China State Bank 5 
Chiyu Banking Corporation 3 
Hua Chiao Commercial Bank 4 
Kincheng Banking Corp. 6 
Kwangtung Provincial Bank 7 
Nanyang Commercial Bank 7 
National Commercial Bank 3 
Po Sang Bank 1 
Sin Hua Trust 7 
Yien Yieh Commercial Bank 5 
Classification based on Bank Returns to the Banking Commissioner for 1970. In 1967 
Chiyu Banking Corporation was removed from the list of Mainland banks but reappeared 
in the list in 1969. Hua Chiao Commercial Bank was moved from local to Mainland in 
1967. Branches from HKRS411/2/45. 
The Bank of China was undoubtedly the most politically influential 
PRC bank in Hong Kong but Nanyang Commercial Bank (locally regis-
tered in Hong Kong) had the largest local deposits and advances. Figure 
3.1 shows the growth in total assets and deposits of Nanyang Commercial
Bank. The rate of growth was interrupted by the communist disturbances 
in Hong Kong in Spring 1967 that affected all PRC banks adversely, and it 
took several years to recover its position. In the boom of the early 1970s, 
however, the bank grew very quickly. 
Based on archival data, Figure 3.2 shows the rise in deposits and 
advances for all PRC banks in Hong Kong from 1964–72. After growing 
quickly at the beginning of this period, deposits and advances declined 
in 1967 due to political disturbances in Hong Kong arising from the 
Cultural Revolution on the Mainland. It took two years for the Main-
land banks to recover the 1966 level of deposits but the rate of increase 
then recovered quickly and by the end of 1972 Mainland banks in 
Hong Kong held over HK$2b (US$354m) of deposits. The fastest growing 
banks after 1967 in terms of deposits were Sin Hua Trust and Kwang-
tung Provincial bank, both of which (along with Nanyang Commer-
cial) had significant branch networks in the colony. In 1964 and in 
1972 these three banks accounted for over 40% of total Mainland 
banks’ deposits in Hong Kong, although their share dipped below 40% 
49 
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Figure 3.2 Mainland Chinese Controlled Banks in Hong Kong 
in the intervening years. In terms of local advances, Sin Hua Trust and 
Nanyang Commercial Bank together accounted for about one third of 
advances by Mainland banks. 
Despite an impressive overall performance, Figure 3.3 shows that the 
Mainland banks did not keep pace with the growth of Hong Kong 
banking during this boom period. After peaking in 1966 at 14% before 
the political troubles of 1967, their share of deposits declined steadily to 
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Figure 3.3 PRC Banks in Hong Kong: Market Share 
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below 9% by the end of 1972.10 After making significant initial progress, 
confidence among depositors in the Mainland-associated banks never 
recovered from the disruptions of 1967 and the ensuing political strife on 
the Mainland. By 1981, after the Open Door policy was in operation, 
Mainland controlled banks restored their share of deposits to 14% and 
increased their share of advances to a historically high level of 15%.11 
While the growth of deposits was sustained at the same rate as for 
the banking system as a whole through most of 1969, there was an 
absolute fall in the level of deposits from May to July 1970. The value 
of deposits then recovered, but no longer grew at the same pace as the 
banking system as a whole. 
Another feature of the Mainland Chinese banks was the low ratio of 
local advances to deposits, which led to high liquidity ratios. Figure 3.4 
shows that most PRC banks were not engaged in substantial lending to 
customers in Hong Kong but mainly collected deposits for other uses, 
particularly to be channelled overseas. Only three small PRC banks met 
the average ratio of loans to deposits of locally incorporated banks. 
When deposits were rising quickly in the years before 1967, advances 
lagged well behind. 
Figure 3.5 shows the high levels of liquidity in Mainland Chinese banks 
compared with other foreign or locally registered banks. Information on 
the specific nature of the liquidity is available only for December 1966 
when it was calculated that 80% of the overall liquidity of Chinese Main-
land banks was held overseas. The other 20% was held in cash and net 
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Figure 3.4 Ratio of Advances to Deposits 
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Figure 3.5 Hong Kong Banks’ Liquid Assets as a Percent of Deposits 
bank balances in Hong Kong. About 70% of these overseas liquid assets 
were held in China, and the rest in London.12 As China’s foreign trade 
bank, the Bank of China predictably held the largest balances on the 
Mainland, accounting for about 35% of the total and over half of Main-
land banks’ assets in the UK. While the Nanyang Commercial Bank 
was more heavily involved in local lending, it was also the next largest 
holder of overseas balances, accounting for 15% of the total held in 
China and 21% of the total balances in the UK. In all, 87% of Main-
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Figure 3.6 Hong Kong Banks’ Balances with Banks in Mainland China 
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land banks’ assets in China were bank deposits and money at call and 
only a small proportion were commercial bills. 
Figure 3.6 shows that claims on banks in the Mainland represented a 
substantial proportion of the deposits collected in Hong Kong. PRC 
banks were the only group that held net claims on banks in China, 
while other banks held small net liabilities. Hong Kong banks’ net claims 
in China declined temporarily during the political unrest in Hong 
Kong in the Summer of 1967, but then recovered until the last quarter 
of 1969. The decline in the claims on banks on the Mainland in the 
second half of 1969 was just as severe as during the May riots of 1967, 
but from the beginning of 1970 a steadily rising amount of funds was 
held in the Mainland, amounting to HK$1b (US$177m) by mid-1971 
and HK$1.3b (US$230m) in 1972. Figure 3.7 shows the half-yearly data 
for PRC banks only. 
In May 1967, the Economic Secretary noted that ‘[T]he money due 
from China amounts to an illegal (but countenanced) keeping of funds 
outside this Colony by the Mainland banks. Other banks which wish 
to keep their money outside the colony comply with the regulations by 
keeping it in London. The PG [PRC Government] is enabled by this to 
use the assets of Hong Kong banks for whatever purpose it likes in the 
medium of Hong Kong dollars or transferable sterling. A useful working 
capital.’13 To put this into perspective, the value of HK$ held in China 
averaged 30% of exports to Hong Kong from 1965–72, and amounted 
to about one month of China’s total import bill in 1968. 
Figure 3.8 shows the relative magnitude of the net balances com-
pared to the value of total deposits in PRC-controlled banks in Hong 
Kong. The rise in this ratio in the early years reflects the slower growth 
of deposits after the riots of 1967 up to 1970. From the start of 1970, 
an increasing proportion of PRC banks’ liquidity was being channelled 
to the PRC, peaking at a net balance equivalent to 60% of total deposits 
by the end of 1972. 
These cross-border balances can be compared with more recent exper-
ience. Since 1999 Hong Kong’s current surplus with the Mainland has 
been offset by outward flows of capital that have led to accumulations of 
net liabilities by Hong Kong banks to the Mainland. In the 1960s, in con-
trast, investment from Hong Kong in the Mainland was prohibited so the 
trade surplus led to an accumulation of claims on banks in China. From 
2000–07 net liabilities of Hong Kong banks to the Mainland amounted 
to an average of 3.7% of total HKD deposits. Figure 3.9 shows that 
net cross-border balances were much higher relatively in the 1950s. 
Even in the 1960s and 1970s, these balances amounted to at least 5% of 
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Figure 3.8 Mainland Banks net claims on Banks in China as Percent of Deposits in 
Hong Kong 
HK$ deposits. Unlike the 2000s, however, changes in the net cross-border 
balances were not more volatile than overall deposits so they did not 
threaten monetary stability in the colony.14 
The financial links between Hong Kong and the Mainland also oper-
ated through branches of Hong Kong banks there, but on a much smaller 
scale. From 1955 the Bank of China agreed to channel enough business 
through the Shanghai office of HSBC to allow it to cover its overheads 
in order to keep the office open. Chartered Bank also continued to 
operate in Shanghai on this basis (in premises below the HSBC). Both 
banks processed documents for exports to various countries, but not for 
imports. Business was very limited, both by the number of staff and by 
the amount of business directed to them by the Bank of China. Profits 
were only allowed to be remitted to head office from 1962 and revenues 
were taxed heavily.15 Chartered Bank had a larger turnover than the 
HSBC office at this time and, indeed, the HSBC Board considered shutting 
the Shanghai Office in March 1962, but decided to remain open in expec-
tation of long-term advantages.16 Figure 3.10 shows the increase in busi-
ness passing through the HSBC Shanghai branch on a half-yearly basis. 
From about 10,000 bills per year (worth £6m) in 1966, the number fell 
to a low of 5,500 in 1970, recovering to 7,700 (worth £7m) by the end 
of 1971. This pattern of business resulted in a rise in the pre-tax profit 
of the Shanghai branch from RMB108,000 in 1968 to RMB288,000 
in 1971. 
56 
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Mostly, however, the Shanghai office was burdened with small and 
unprofitable Demand Debit (DD) and Mail Transfers. In 1974 the HSBC 
estimated that total remittances by individuals to the Mainland via 
Hong Kong was HK$1.9b (US$380m), rising to HK$2.13b (US$426m) in 
1975.17 By November 1978, the office was processing about 800 export 
bills per month, which was not much greater than the 700 per month 
in the second half of 1971. In September 1978 the General Manager 
Overseas Operations visited the Shanghai office and found it ‘depress-
ing’, ‘old fashioned and rather gloomy’ and he recommended that the 
office should not engage in any further correspondent business (mainly 
low value DD and Mail Transfers).18 
Despite the increase in bill business from the 1970s, the Shanghai 
office continued to be constrained by staff shortages and was unable to 
increase it business. The local staff was aging and new staff appointed 
by the Bank of China had limited English. Indeed, in November 1978 
on the eve of the announcement of the Open Door policy the Shanghai 
Manager wrote to Head Office asking to reduce the volume of docu-
ments referred to his office.19 
The evidence presented here shows the integration of Hong Kong 
with the Mainland from the 1950s through to the advent of the Open 
Door Policy. Also evident is the continuity of this link throughout the 
period, and that it operated mainly from the branches of Mainland 
banks in Hong Kong rather than through the residual offices of foreign 
banks on the Mainland. 
Exchange rate policy 
As in the current context, the exchange rate between the HK$ and the 
RMB was fundamental to cross-border economic relations between the 
two territories from the late 1960s. Throughout most of this period 
the PRC operated a managed floating regime but from January 1974 
the regime changed to a de facto crawling band around the US$ with 
fluctuations of +/–2%.20 The HK$ was pegged to sterling until July 1972, 
two weeks after sterling floated. At this point, anchor currency was 
changed to the US$. The HK$ was depreciated slightly in November 1967 
after the devaluation of sterling in that month (although not by as 
much as sterling was devalued). Both currencies appreciated against 
the US$ from December 1971 when the USA devalued the US$. With 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the Spring of 1973, the 
HK$ re-pegged to the US$ at just over HK$5 (an appreciation of 17%). 
The RMB was also stabilised against the US$ and the premium on the 
19
67
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Figure 3.11 HK$ per RMB 1967–75 
black market contracted. Figure 3.11 shows the monthly cross rate 
between the HK$ and the RMB. 
Hong Kong’s decision not to follow sterling in November 1967 owed 
much to the public sensitivity to the RMB/HK$ exchange rate at this 
time. London informed the Hong Kong government of its intention to 
devalue the pound at 1:30am on Sunday 19 November and an Executive 
Council meeting was convened that evening to determine Hong Kong’s 
response. A Bank of England representative described the meeting as 
quite heated, with strong indignation expressed by the representative 
from HSBC in particular who objected to the lack of consultation and 
the loss in the foreign currency value of sterling assets. Malaysia and 
Singapore had already declared that they would not follow sterling, 
which surprised those in Hong Kong who now understood that there 
was a choice to make and they groped for an assessment of Hong 
Kong’s own interests. The Executive Council debate was ‘a struggle 
between the banking group and some official and the Chinese mem-
bers who were particularly concerned with the prospects of rising costs’ 
so the impact of increased prices from devaluing the HKD against its 
trading partners was clearly in the minds of legislators.21 However, after 
only 45 minutes the Council agreed to follow sterling, in a decision 
pushed through by British official members of the Council (Ronald 
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Holmes, acting Colonial Secretary and later Secretary for Chinese Affairs, 
was the only one to vote against devaluation) while all the Chinese 
representatives voted against devaluation. This decision proved hugely 
controversial as food prices immediately increased. The following day 
the Communist influenced Hong Kong papers were all vehemently 
against the devaluation of the HKD, although the other press reaction 
was more mixed.22 The Bank of China announced that they would not 
follow sterling, so the RMB appreciated 14.3% against the HKD and 
food prices in Hong Kong immediately increased, leading to intensify-
ing political pressure on the Financial Secretary to reverse his decision. 
By Tuesday 22 November, Cowperthwaite was re-considering the 
Executive Council’s decision and a 10% revaluation was announced 
the following day. A survey of 720 people from all walks of life con-
ducted by the Department of Chinese Affairs noted that most people 
did not understand why any devaluation was necessary and they were 
especially concerned by the impact on the cost of living.23 
Figure 3.11 shows that after the RMB appreciated in 1967, the 
exchange rate was stable until the suspension of US$ convertibility in 
the Nixon Shock of August 1971. Until the US$ was re-pegged at the 
end of 1971, the RMB was allowed to depreciate against the HK$. Once 
the US$ was stabilised the RMB began again to appreciate against the 
HK$. Of course the RMB was not convertible during this period so that 
the exchange rates were centrally determined rates rather than market 
rates. However it is clear that the rate between the HK$ and the RMB 
and the use of Hong Kong as China’s international financial centre 
during the 1960s and 1970s had important implications for Hong 
Kong’s own exchange policy. 
By the end of the mid-1960s the USA was the largest market for 
Hong Kong’s exports and Japan was the largest source of imports. 
These two trade relations suggested that a peg to the US$ would have 
made more sense for the Hong Kong dollar than a peg to sterling. 
Nevertheless, despite the falling proportion of sterling trade, Hong 
Kong’s foreign exchange reserves remained 99% invested in sterling 
assets and sterling was the intervention currency. This was to some 
extent a legacy of historic trade patterns, but was also encouraged by 
contemporary circumstances including the market price of these British 
government securities, high interest rates on short-term sterling assets 
(by 1972 Hong Kong earned about £30m per year in interest on its ster-
ling assets24), and the important role that Hong Kong played as a 
financial intermediary for China. Most importantly for this chapter, 
Hong Kong needed to be able to convert China’s substantial HK$ earn-
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ings into sterling, which was China’s preferred international currency. 
After sterling floated in 1972 and relations between China and the USA 
warmed, the supply of sterling through Hong Kong became less impor-
tant to China and Hong Kong accelerated its diversification away from 
sterling. 
Figure 13.12 shows Chinese banks’ purchases of sterling through 
Hong Kong. Sales by HSBC alone accounted for slightly less than half 
on average. The total amount fell slightly in 1967 due to a shortage of 
sterling caused by local monetary conditions in Hong Kong after the 
riots of May-September of that year.25 In 1968 and 1969 sales of ster-
ling to the PRC recovered and then increased sharply in 1970 when 
China ran its first substantial trade deficit since 1960.26 In the same 
year, purchases of sterling amounted to over a third of China’s total 
import bill. By 1973 Hong Kong banks sold over £500m to the Bank of 
China, amounting to 25% of China’s total import bill for that year.27 
Given this evidence of substantial purchases of sterling through Hong 
Kong, a stable exchange rate between the HK$ and sterling was parti-
cularly important for China. 
Following losses sustained from the devaluation of sterling against 
the US$ in 1967, in 1968 China began to insist that its export contracts 
be denominated in (overvalued) RMB and conducted through foreign 
banks’ RMB accounts with the Bank of China.28 Moreover, between 
1967 and 1968, Mainland banks reduced their net assets in London 
from HK$1.7b to HK$33m. By the end of 1973 the Bank of China 
claimed that over 60 countries used RMB in commercial transactions 
with the PRC.29 Settlement took place through foreign currency accounts 
opened by the Bank of China with a wide range of correspondent banks, 
and RMB denominated accounts opened by correspondent banks at 
the Bank of China. Because of the dispute over frozen US$ assets from 
1950, there were no direct correspondent relations with American 
banks, although the Bank of China had correspondent relationships 
with foreign banks located in the USA. 
Exchanging RMB to hard currency was only possible for transactions 
related to an official export contract, which restricted the transferabil-
ity and convertibility of RMB surpluses. Because the RMB was not con-
vertible to US$, proceeds had to be converted first to sterling and then 
to the trader’s domestic currency. Forward markets in some European 
currencies such as SwFr, DM and £ were created through Chinese banks 
in Hong Kong and through appointed correspondent banks. But 
China’s largest trading partner, Japan, needed to exchange their RMB 
to sterling or change sterling for RMB to complete their trade contracts. 
62 
04HKRC_cha03(45-72) 9/9/08 2:32 PM Page 62 
Proof
70
£ million
60 50 40 30 20 10 0
19
57
19
58
 
19
59
 
19
60
 
19
61
 
19
62
 
19
63
 
19
64
 
19
65
 
19
66
 
19
67
 
19
68
 
19
69
 
19
70
 
19
71
 
19
72
 
19
73
 
Fi
gu
re
 3
.1
2 
St
er
li
n
g 
So
ld
 t
o 
C
h
in
a 
ag
ai
n
st
 H
K
$ 
M
on
th
ly
 J
u
n
e 
19
57
–S
ep
te
m
be
r 
19
73
 
04HKRC_cha03(45-72) 9/9/08 2:32 PM Page 63 
Proof 
Catherine R. Schenk 63 
Until 1975 sterling was formally the final currency of settlement for trade 
contracts between Japan and China, a restriction that proved costly to 
Japanese exporters as Japan’s trade surplus mounted and sterling weak-
ened against the yen. Japan was China’s largest non-socialist trading 
partner by 1969 and the largest supplier of iron and steel, exporting over 
1 million tons per annum from 1968 which accounted for over 40% of 
Japan’s exports to China in the early 1970s. In April 1973, China also 
signed a contract to supply Japan with crude oil from the Daqing oil field, 
just in time for the oil crisis that began in the autumn. 
China earned a substantial surplus in foreign exchange from exports 
of price inelastic products such as food and water to Hong Kong.30 
The trade balance averaged HK$2.5b per year from 1966–69 but then 
increased sharply during the early 1970s to HK$5.4b in 1973. More-
over, the proportion of these exports that were consumed in Hong 
Kong rather than re-exported remained at about 75% until 1976. The 
exchange rate between the Hong Kong dollar and other currencies was 
therefore of vital interest to China since the surplus with Hong Kong 
was used to pay for imports from elsewhere. The proceeds of exports to 
Hong Kong were determined by the state-set RMB prices of exports to 
Hong Kong and by the exchange rate between the RMB and HK$. In 
common with other Comecon countries, to improve foreign exchange 
earnings China used a combination of exchange rate appreciation and 
price manipulation. Raising food prices generated friction between 
Hong Kong and China so the management of the balance between the 
two countries was a delicate matter. 
Hong Kong’s exchange rate policy and reserves policy was further 
complicated by relations with the UK. In July 1968 Hong Kong signed 
one of the first Sterling Agreements with the UK, by which they agreed 
to hold 99% their reserves in sterling (a proportion known as the 
Minimum Sterling Proportion [MSP]) in return for an exchange rate 
guarantee (for the value of £ against the US$) for 90% of those bal-
ances.31 By the end of March 1970 Hong Kong held £422m in sterling 
and the colony was largest single holder of sterling reserves in the 
world.32 In August 1971 after the re-negotiation of the three-year agree-
ments, the British government (HMG) offered a reduction in Hong 
Kong’s MSP by 10% to 89%, and this was accepted, but the high inter-
est rates available in London encouraged the Hong Kong government 
to delay diversification.33 
The re-emergence of China into the international economy co-incided 
with the collapse of the international monetary system. In August 1971 
after a run on the US$, Nixon suspended convertibility to gold and 
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threatened to impose a 10% surcharge on all imports into the USA unless 
other countries adjusted their exchange rates to ease the US balance of 
payments deficit. After frantic negotiations, the Smithsonian Agreement 
was signed in Washington that re-established the fixed exchange rate 
system at adjusted parities in December 1971. These new rates proved 
impossible for some countries to defend and from June 1972 sterling 
floated. Finally, in February 1973 the US$ was devalued again prompting 
most countries to break their pegs from March 1973 and the era of 
floating exchange rates began. The Chinese government viewed the col-
lapse of the international monetary system as an example of the weak-
ness of US hegemony, but it also created serious problems for China’s 
trade links.34 
This uncertainty and the changing paradigm of the international 
monetary system posed major challenges for Hong Kong as an impor-
tant industrial exporter, a major regional financial centre, as a financial 
entrepot for Mainland China, and also as a colony linked to an imper-
ial metropole. If the HK$ were pegged to a sinking currency (either 
sterling or US$), China would adjust their exchange rate or raise the 
price of exports to Hong Kong to protect the hard-currency value of its 
HK$ earnings. As Leo Goodstadt, then Deputy Editor of the Far Eastern 
Economic Review put it in 1972: 
Peking in the end decides which parity is correct for the colony. If 
the US dollar weakens, Peking will signal its desire for new arrange-
ments for the colony’s currency by devaluing the Hongkong dollar 
against the RMB. Unlike other economies, Hongkong cannot simply 
choose its own rate of exchange, or its links with other countries, on 
the basis of its export interests alone. Hongkong, to survive, must 
maintain its value to China.35 
When the US$ was devalued against gold in December 1971, the HK$ 
continued at the same peg to sterling (a revaluation of 8.57% against 
the US$), citing the dangers to the cost of living posed by higher 
import prices if the HK$ were devalued against sterling, and therefore 
the RMB. The Financial Secretary revealed publicly that a lesser revalu-
ation of perhaps 6% only had been considered by was rejected because 
of the projected rise in the import bill of 3.5%.36 In January 1972 the 
RMB followed to keep in line with the HK$. 
On 23 June 1972, sterling floated, launching a new round of prob-
lems and negotiations. When London told Hong Kong about the ster-
ling float on 23 June (without any advance notice) they advised rather 
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brusquely that ‘HMG’s action does not bind non-metropolitan ter-
ritories. Your government should consider whether to follow the UK or 
to peg to the dollar. We shall need to inform the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] of your decision’. Hong Kong’s governor, Sir Murray 
MacLehose asked if the HK$ could be allowed to float freely, separate 
from sterling, but was told firmly that ‘independent floating by HK 
dollar would not (repeat not) be appropriate, since present speculative 
pressure does not apply to Hong Kong’.37 The IMF could be persuaded 
that sterling had to float in response to speculative pressure but a breach 
in the Bretton Woods rules for Hong Kong could not be justified. A 
week after sterling floated, the Governor of Hong Kong wrote to London 
‘we are veering to the view that our interests would best be served 
during the period of the sterling float (and only during that period) by 
pegging on the US$, at about the previous cross rate’. Hong Kong 
banks wanted to avoid the uncertainty of floating. Also, the Bank of 
China was unsettled by the floating pound and this undermined Hong 
Kong’s traditional role as a supplier of foreign exchange for China. The 
HSBC reported difficulty selling sterling to the Bank of China because 
of conflicts over the rate quoted against the HK$. This enhanced the 
anxiety about the HK$ exchange rate and the continued usefulness of 
Hong Kong to China.38 
The Governor insisted that ‘I would of course deplore anything which 
appeared to reduce the link with the UK, but such a move could be pre-
sented as a purely temporary measure pending the return of sterling to a 
new fixed parity, and I feel sure it would be seen, just as the float is seen, 
as something ephemeral’.39 The HSBC’s view was that once the link to 
sterling had been broken, the government’s stated intention to revert to 
sterling once that currency had stabilised was ‘most illogical’.40 The 
British Treasury and Foreign Office tried to persuade MacLehose to main-
tain the link to sterling but were not successful.41 The Bank of England 
believed that the Hong Kong authorities would have preferred to keep the 
link with sterling, but were persuaded that if sterling floated down too 
low then this would cause inflation because of the rise in the cost of 
imports from China. Clearly the China factor was important. 
China was the largest supplier of the imports that directly affected wage 
rates – food and water. From 1967–80 Hong Kong imported about 50% of 
its domestic food consumption from China alone.42 China accounted 
for 80–85% of live animal imports at this time and Chau has argued 
that Mainland food products were particularly important for working 
class Chinese diets.43 Figure 3.13 shows that the price of foodstuffs 
was rising in 1970–72 faster than the overall Consumer Price Index for 
66 
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low-income households, although the sharpest increase did not come 
until world prices rose in 1973.44 Nominal wages, however, had 
reached an inflection point in 1970 to a higher rate of growth. These 
developments help to explain the enhanced sensitivity of the govern-
ment and employers to the cost of living, although Chau did not 
detect a direct relationship between wages and prices. 
The difficulties facing banks and objections from London were over-
ridden by the importance of stable links with China and the threat to 
the cost of living in Hong Kong. Concern in the local press focused on 
rising prices of imported food and vegetables from China; on 29 June 
the wholesale price of imported vegetables from China increased from 
HK$53.79 per picul to $70 per picul.45 On 6 July 1972 the Governor 
reported that after consultation with the Executive Council, the HK$ 
was to be pegged temporarily to the US$ at HK$5.65 = US$1 with a 
2.25% margin either side of parity. This rate was 1.22% below Smith-
sonian rate of HK$5.5821 set in December 1971 and represented a revalu-
ation against sterling of 5.2%.46 A day later the Chinese revalued the RMB 
just over 1% against the HK$ to RMB39.73/HK$100 and 2.2% higher 
against the US$. As the Governor stated, ‘in other words, their response 
to our announcement that we were temporarily pegging the HK$ to 
the US$ has been exactly as we predicted’.47 He estimated that the 
revaluation of the RMB would raise import prices by 6% causing a 1.5% 
rise in the cost of living.48 In 2007, Hong Kong imported about 70% of 
food from the Mainland, exaggerating the potential impact of RMB 
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appreciation on the cost of living for lower income earners. It was 
estimated that a 5% appreciation of the RMB against the HK$ would 
generate a 1% increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI).49 There is, 
therefore, continuity in the sensitivity of Hong Kong’s economy to 
exchange rate policy on the Mainland. 
As July 1972 progressed the HK$ slumped to the bottom of its band 
against the US$ but Hong Kong did not have reserves of US$ to defend 
the rate. Instead, the Hong Kong government was forced to sell sterling 
for US$ to then buy HK$ to support the rate. At this point the Hong 
Kong government reported that they were running out of sterling cash 
and would soon need to liquidate sterling securities. Sandberg of HSBC 
believed that Haddon-Cave had picked the exchange rate of HK$5.65/ 
USD ‘arbitrarily’ and that the rate was too high from the outset. He 
advised Haddon-Cave that 
Cutting ourselves off from sterling, however, tempting it might seem 
to set the HK$ up as an independent currency instead of merely an 
adjunct of sterling which it has always been, was taking a risk when 
practically all of Hong Kong’s reserves were in sterling. Secondly 
with the almost total lack of exchange control regulations here spec-
ulation against the HK$ (whether as an over or an under valued 
currency) could be a gnome of Zurich’s dream and a Financial 
Secretary’s nightmare.50 
At the end of August 1972 the banks agreed that HSBC would have a 
monopoly on market intervention to support the exchange rate and 
discretion over when to intervene.51 By mid-September Haddon-Cave 
was in London where he advised the Bank of England and UK Treasury 
that ‘we are trying to explain to Hong Kong banks that the Hong Kong 
government runs the place, but it is rather difficult’.52 
In February 1973 the US$ was further devalued by 10% but the HK$ 
was kept at its gold parity (revalued against the US$ to HK$5.085 = US$1) 
in order to maintain parity with the RMB. By July 1973 the HK$ was 
being dragged down against sterling partly by the continued devaluation 
of the US$ and partly due to the outflow of capital from the colony after 
the end of the stock exchange boom.53 The Bank of England wanted to 
advise Hong Kong to float its currency or at least to revalue against the 
sinking US$ but the UK Treasury disagreed.54 During the summer the 
RMB was appreciated against the HK$ and the US$ and at the same time 
RMB-denominated prices of Chinese exports rose dramatically, putting 
double pressure on Hong Kong’s food costs. 
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At the beginning of August 1973, the Hong Kong government finally 
attempted to end the historic commitment to sterling reserves, announc-
ing to the Bank of England that if a new sterling guarantee was not 
forthcoming within a week, it would diversify official sterling assets 
down to 50% of total reserves. At this point Hong Kong’s sterling assets 
were £660m amounting to 88.6% of total reserves.55 MacLehose remarked 
that ‘we have held on out of loyalty and in the expectation of definite 
proposals from HMG, and required the banks to do so too. Because the 
guarantee itself is now of so little value we have long passed the point 
of commercial prudence.’56 The reply from the British government was 
categorical that ‘we cannot endorse any diversification of your own 
official reserves’ because of the threat to the global sterling exchange 
rate arising from the sale of such large sterling balances. MacLehose 
and Haddon-Cave set out for London to take on their imperial leaders.57 
They left again empty-handed to the dismay of the legislative council, 
who wrote to the Acting Governor in strong terms that they were 
‘gravely dissatisfied with the attitude of the British government over a 
matter which is of vital importance to the economy of Hong Kong’.58 
A week before all the sterling agreements were due to expire at the end 
of September 1973, sterling came under pressure in foreign exchange 
markets as traders worried about what would replace the Sterling Agree-
ments. This prompted the British government to offer a unilateral agree-
ment to guarantee sterling balances at a new slightly higher rate. Leo 
Goodstadt reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review that ‘A sweaty 
hand pushed a tatty piece of paper at Hong Kong Financial Secretary 
Philip Haddon-Cave when he stopped at Bahrain recently on a flight back 
from London’.59 This was the final offer of a sterling agreement to com-
pensate Hong Kong if sterling should fall below US$2.4213 averaged out 
on the exchange rates that would prevail up to the end of March 1974. 
This was a slight improvement on the $2.40 threshold but nowhere near 
the $2.60 that Hong Kong had first claimed. In addition the guarantee 
was to be for official balances only with no consideration of commercial 
bank balances. At the end of December 1973, 76% of Hong Kong’s official 
exchange reserves were still denominated in sterling.60 
During 1974 there was further pressure on the HK$/US$ rate and the 
price of US$1 fell below HK$5.05 in July. From the 20–26 November 
1974 the HK$ came under considerable pressure and was finally floated 
free from its link to the US$ on 27 November. The General Manager 
of HSBC was very aggrieved not to have been consulted formally in 
advance, although he had met with Haddon-Cave the night before the 
announcement.61 
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Conclusions 
This paper has described in new detail the banking and monetary links 
between Hong Kong and Mainland China from the 1960s until the eve 
of the Open Door Policy. Hong Kong acted as a vital external partner 
throughout this period both in terms of sales of foreign exchange to 
the Bank of China, and also as a source of funds channelled through 
Mainland-controlled banks registered in the Colony. Indeed these cross-
border balances were larger relative to total deposits than they are today. 
This paper has also shown how the disarray in foreign exchange markets 
complicated the delicate relationship between Hong Kong and Mainland 
China and affected Hong Kong’s ability to adapt to the emergence of 
China into the international economy. Supplies of food from China were 
essential, particularly to the labour force in Hong Kong’s rapidly grow-
ing industrial sector and this put Hong Kong at the mercy of China’s 
exchange rate and pricing policy. Meanwhile, Hong Kong was caught by 
the legacy of colonial links to the UK and substantial sterling assets, 
without the independence to diversify its reserves once sterling was less 
important to China. The sterling link had been vital to Hong Kong’s use-
fulness to Mainland China throughout the 1960s but with the collapse of 
the international monetary system, the complicated and prolonged extri-
cation from sterling presented new problems for the colonial adminis-
tration, both internally and externally as China diversified its own trade 
and payments. 
Hong Kong’s economic relations with the Mainland are now much 
more complex and comprise not only essential imports, but also process-
ing trade, exports of services and flows of investment. The impact of the 
strengthening RMB on the Hong Kong economy, therefore, will be more 
widely distributed than in the 1960s and 1970s and the increased compet-
itiveness of Hong Kong’s exports of goods and services may well outweigh 
the increase in import prices. Nevertheless, this chapter has shown that 
the exchange rate between the HKD and the RMB first became an impor-
tant policy issue forty years ago and promoted the further economic 
estrangement of the colony from the UK. Along with the rise in cross 
border bank balances, the disarray in exchange markets led to a closer real-
ization of the continued importance of the Mainland to Hong Kong’s 
longer-term economic viability even when China was relatively closed to 
the rest of the world. This reality is at the basis of the one-country, two 
currencies system that has sustained the relationship between Hong Kong 
SAR and the Mainland since 1997 and will continue to be fundamental to 
future changes in the currency arrangements between these territories. 
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